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Background. In 1976, the ﬁrst cases of Ebola virus disease in northern Democratic Republic of the Congo (then referred to as
Zaire) were reported. This article addresses who was responsible for recognizing the disease; recovering, identifying, and naming the
virus; and describing the epidemic. Key scientiﬁc approaches used in 1976 and their relevance to the 3-country (Guinea, Sierra Leone,
and Liberia) West African epidemic during 2013–2016 are presented.
Methods. Field and laboratory investigations started soon after notiﬁcation, in mid-September 1976, and included virus cell
culture, electron microscopy (EM), immunoﬂuorescence antibody (IFA) testing of sera, case tracing, containment, and epidemio-
logical surveys. In 2013–2016, medical care and public health work were delayed for months until the Ebola virus disease epidemic
was ofﬁcially declared an emergency by World Health Organization, but research in pathogenesis, clinical presentation, including
sequelae, treatment, and prevention, has increased more recently.
Results. Filoviruses were cultured and observed by EM in Antwerp, Belgium (Institute of Tropical Medicine); Porton Down,
United Kingdom (Microbiological Research Establishment); and Atlanta, Georgia (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention).
In Atlanta, serological testing identiﬁed a new virus. The 1976 outbreak (280 deaths among 318 cases) stopped in <11 weeks,
and basic clinical and epidemiological features were deﬁned. The recent massive epidemic during 2013–2016 (11 310 deaths
among 28 616 cases) has virtually stopped after >2 years. Transmission indices (R0) are higher in all 3 countries than in 1976.
Conclusions. An international commission working harmoniously in laboratories and with local communities was essential for
rapid success in 1976. Control and understanding of the recent West African outbreak were delayed because of late recognition and
because authorities were overwhelmed by many patients and poor community involvement. Despite obstacles, research was a priority
in 1976 and recently.
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In late August 1976, patients with a hemorrhagic fever syn-
drome presented to the rural Yambuku Mission Hospital
(YMH) in northwest Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC;
then referred to as Zaire); Congolese medical staff responded
and ruled out the provisional diagnosis of malaria, typhoid,
or yellow fever. Expert assistance was requested by the govern-
ment from several countries in October 1976 by the minister of
health. The International Commission for the Investigation and
Control of Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever in Zaire reported their
ﬁndings in 1978 [1]. With the recent massive epidemic of
Ebola virus disease in Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, there
has been focus on lessons from the ﬁrst outbreak [2]. There have
been many questions raised by the scientiﬁc and lay communi-
ties and misattributions, ascribing credit for “discovery” of
Ebola. This article is written to (1) state for the record who was
responsible for recognizing the new disease, for recovering,
identifying, and naming Ebola virus, and for describing and con-
trolling the epidemic in Yambuku, which spread into Kinshasa;
and (2) to show the relevance of the 1976 outbreak to the 2013–
2016 epidemic.
OUTBREAK ONSET AND DISCOVERY
On 22 August 1976, the 42-year-old headmaster of the Yambuku
Mission School, a resident of Yandongi Village, Bumba Zone,
Equateur Region, returned from a 2-week driving excursion to
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northern Zaire; along the route, he purchased antelope and smoked
monkey meat. He presented on 26 August to the outpatient clinic
of the 120-bed YMHwith chills and fever and was treated for ma-
laria with injections of chloroquine and an antipyretic by the chief
medical assistant at YMH, with apparent relief. The patient’s fever
diminished initially but after 1 week returned with severe head-
ache, muscle pain, nausea, abdominal complaints, and intestinal
bleeding. He died on 6 September with a hemorrhagic syndrome
of unknown cause. On 28 August 1976, an adult male was hospi-
talized on the medical ward at YMH with “epistaxis, dysentery,
and fever,” recorded in the hospital register. This patient re-
mained for 2 days and left without follow-up; he was unknown
in the nearby village of Yandongi, listed as his residence.
Several patients coming to YMH with a variety of conditions,
including pregnancy, were given vitamins and other medicines
by injection; injections were a routine practice favored by patients
and medical staff. Five glass syringes and metal needles used at
the outpatient department, inpatient medicine wards, and prena-
tal and village outreach clinics were used repeatedly without ster-
ilization and only occasionally were rinsed. In early September,
several dozen patients who had received injections at YMH devel-
oped a similar febrile hemorrhagic syndrome and died in about 1
week, as did many of their contacts [1].
INITIAL NATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE “MYSTERY
DISEASE OF YAMBUKU”
The ﬁrst national alert and response to the growing outbreak
came from Ngoy Mushola, the chief medical ofﬁcer of the
Bumba Zone, who came to Yambuku during 15–19 September
1976. His report to Kinshasa was the ﬁrst to describe the “mys-
tery” disease manifesting fever, headache, abdominal pain, and
bleeding; from 5 to 22 September, Ngoy reported 30 cases and
22 deaths, and patients were ﬂeeing the hospital. Later studies
showed that >120 cases had occurred during this time, over
half of which were tied to injections [1].
On 23 September, a national team led by Jean-Jacques
Muyembé-Tamfun, a microbiologist, and Colonel Omombo, an
epidemiologist, was sent from Kinshasa to Yambuku by Ngueté
Kinkhela, the minister of health. Severe typhoid or yellow fever
were diagnosed provisionally. On the morning of 24 September,
postmortem liver tissue specimens were collected from 3 de-
ceased nurses and blood specimens were collected for typhoid di-
agnosis. A 40-year-old Belgian midwife nun who had been
delivering newborns from sick women had fever and headaches;
she reported being vaccinated against typhoid and yellow fever.
She and several other ill persons were treated with an antimicro-
bial and other drugs, many of which were given by injection.
Anti-typhoid vaccination activities were recommended. This na-
tional team returned to Kinshasa on 24 September with the sick
nun accompanied by another Belgian sister and a priest; they
took 2 commercial ﬂights from Bumba to Kinshasa, via Kisanga-
ni. The specimens were processed at the University of Kinshasa
laboratories by Professor Muyembé and were inconclusive for
yellow fever but paired sera suggested typhoid.
Because of increasing alarm, Jean-François Ruppol, chief of
the Belgian Fonds Médical Tropical (FOMETRO), DRC; Gerard
Rafﬁer, chief of the French Medical Mission; and Dr Krubwa of
the National University of Zaire visited Bumba and Yambuku
by military helicopter from 4–9 October. Blood samples were
taken from 2 persons whom they judged to have recovered
from the clinical disease. The team advised the Commisaire
du Zone, Ipoya Olonga, that Bumba Zone (275 000 persons)
be put under strict quarantine and YMH be closed. The advice
was accepted, stopping commercial airplane landings, move-
ment in and out of villages, and prohibiting riverboats from
docking along the Zaire River. Ultimately, 13 of 17 YMH staff
(76%) became ill with the disease, and 11 (80%) died.
VIRUS ISOLATION AND IDENTIFICATION
On 28 September 1976, just prior to her death, a blood specimen
was again collected from the sick nun from Yambuku by Jacques
Courteille, a Belgian physician working at Ngaliema Hospital in
Kinshasa. He reported that she had a 5-day febrile, hemorrhagic
illness, possibly yellow fever. The sample arrived in a broken vial
at the Institute of Tropical Medicine (ITM; Antwerp, Belgium)
on 29 September, followed by a postmortem liver specimen a
day later. These specimens were inoculated into Vero cells and
analyzed by Guido van der Groen, René Delgadillo, and Peter
Piot in the microbiology department directed by Stefaan Pattyn
[3]; a cytopathic effect was observed. When a Marburg-like virus
was observed by electron microscopist Wim Jacob, the World
Health Organization (WHO; Geneva, Switzerland) was notiﬁed:
the ITM teamwas told by Paul Brès of theWHO to send all spec-
imens immediately to the Microbiological Research Establish-
ment (MRE; Porton Down, United Kingdom), arriving on 5
October. Some materials were forwarded to the Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention (CDC; Atlanta, Georgia), arriving
on 11 October and 13 October; both laboratories had maximum
containment for highly pathogenic viruses. The ITM retained
some specimens in Antwerp [3]. At the MRE, Ernest Bowen,
Graham Lloyd, William Harris, Geoff Platt, Arthur Baskerville,
and Ethelwald Vella did the analyses. In Kinshasa, Gerard Rafﬁer
sent the blood samples taken from convalescent patients and oth-
ers to Pierre Sureau at the Institute Pasteur (Paris, France). As
Pasteur likewise lacked a maximum containment unit, Sureau
was urged by Brès to ship all specimens immediately to the
CDC (P. Sureau, Une nouvelle ﬁèvre hemorrhagique virale Afri-
caine: l’epidémie de Yambuku, Zaire, 1976: la découverte du
virus Ebola; Carnet de Route, unpublished memoir).
Inoculation into animals and cell lines occurred in all 3 lab-
oratories, and virus was grown (Table 1). Filovirus particles, re-
sembling Marburg virus, were seen by negative contrast electron
microscopy (EM) of Vero cell culture supernatant of blood and
by thin-section EM [4–6].
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Using the remaining drops of convalescent serum squeezed
from a black cotton mass in a broken test tube received from
Sureau, a new etiologic agent was identiﬁed in the Special Path-
ogens Branch, CDC, by Patricia Webb, James Lange, and Karl
Johnson. Patricia Webb showed that serum from 1 convalescent
DRC patient did not cross-react with an archived Marburg virus
in a 2-way immunoﬂuorescence antibody (IFA) test; sera from
the convalescent DRC patient and from Marburg patients were
tested against viruses from a DRC patient and a Marburg virus,
and a positive reaction occurred only between DRC sera and
DRC virus and between Marburg sera and archived Marburg
viruses (Table 2) [1, 4]. The iconic EM pictures of the new
virus were taken by Alyne Harrison and FredMurphy (Figure 1)
at the CDC. Harrison performed many of the thin-section EM
examinations of ﬁxed liver specimens from DRC patients, and
Murphy took the negative-contrast EM photos.
Biosafety precautions in Antwerp and Paris were those taken
on an open bench, without a hood or laminar ﬂow system. Lab-
oratory coats, gloves, absorbent covering on the bench, and hy-
pochlorite solution for disinfection were used. Special concern
in Antwerp was avoiding contamination of cell cultures. In
Paris, upon opening a thermos arriving from Kinshasa, 1 test
tube broke, and the contents were transferred to another vacu-
tainer. After being informed by the WHO to send the materials
to the CDC, all Paris specimens were packaged in accordance
with instructions received by Pasteur for shipping specimens
containing Lassa fever virus.
POSSIBLE SUDANESE ORIGIN
Shortly after being notiﬁed of the outbreak in Zaire, in late Sep-
tember, the WHO reported that a similar outbreak of hemor-
rhagic fever was occurring in southern Sudan [7]. A national
investigation later determined that on 27 June 1976, patients
with a hemorrhagic illness started dying in Nzara, Western
Equatorial Province. The outbreak spread to the neighboring
town of Maridi on 6 August. National public health authorities
were ﬁrst notiﬁed of the epidemic on 26 September, after which
they visited Maridi, where 30 patients with the syndrome were
hospitalized and specimens were collected. Upon returning to
Khartoum on 29 September 1976, the WHO was notiﬁed,
and the specimens were forwarded to the MRE.
As it was reported that palm oil and other commerce traveled
along northern DRC routes to neighboring countries, including
Sudan, the initial hypothesis of the Zaire team was that the
Table 2. Reciprocal Immunofluorescence Assay–Based Titers of Patients With Marburg (19’67 and 1975) and Zaire (1976; “Marburg-Like”) Virus Disease
Year of Illness/Virus
Serum
Origin/Country
Time After
Onset/Patient(s)
Viral Antigen
Marburg 1967 No. 718, Zaire, 1976
1967/Marburg virus Germany 5 mo 128 <10
5 mo 64 <8
1975/Marburg virus South Africa 1 mo 64 <4
4 mo 64 <4
1976/Ebola virus Sudan 12 d <2 16
12 d <2 <2
1976/Ebola virus Zaire “Convalescent”, 1 mo 4 160
Table 1. Isolation and Characterization Methods Used By 3 Laboratories to Identify Ebola Virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Formerly Referred
as Zaire) in 1976
Laboratory, Test/Culture Systems
Criterion for Positive
Test Result Time, d
Electron Microscopy or IF Test
Result for Filovirus (Date)
Institute of Tropical Medicine, Antwerp, Belgium
Newborn mice Dead 4–5 ND
Weaning mice Dead 7 ND
Vero cells CPE complete 11 Positive (11 October)
Porton Down, United Kingdom
Newborn mice Dead 5–9 ND
Guinea pigs (blood and liver) Fever, dead 4–7, 12 Positive (5–13 October)
Vero cells CPE partial 6–7 Positive (5–13 October)
CDC, Atlanta, GA
Vero cells CPE partial 3, 6–7 Positive (13 October)
Patient liver Virus seen . . . Positive (13 October)
Immunofluorescence antibody testing 1:160 titer 1 Positive (14 October)
Abbreviations: CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; CPE, cytopathic effect; GA, Georgia; IF, immunofluorescence; ND, not done.
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epidemics were connected. Epidemiologists Joseph McCormick of
the CDC and Simon van Nieuwenhove of FOMETROwere airlift-
ed to northeastern Zaire in late October to follow highly degraded,
virtually impassable routes; question local authorities; seek cases;
collect samples from patients and those who had possibly recov-
ered; and review medical records. The McCormick team crossed
25 km into Sudan, visiting Nzara. Following 3 weeks of travel, no
link between the Sudan and Zaire outbreaks was found. Notable
was that persons afﬂicted in Nzara worked in a cotton factory in
which many bats were hanging from the rafters. Because civil war
was occurring in Sudan, the SudanWHO investigative team could
not access the outbreak area until after the Zaire team visit.
It was later determined that Ebola Sudan virus causing the
Sudan outbreak was different serologically from Ebola Zaire
[8]. While the Zaire and Sudan presentations were marked by
almost universal fever, headache, abdominal pain, diarrhea,
nausea and vomiting, bleeding, oral lesions, and conjunctivitis,
the main differences involved the case-fatality rates, with values
of 88% (280 deaths/318 cases) in Zaire and 53% (151 deaths/284
cases) in Sudan, and the high frequency of chest pain (83%) and
cough (49%) in Sudan [1, 7].
DESCRIPTION AND CONTROL OF THE EPIDEMIC
The most comprehensive description of the 318 patients afﬂict-
ed was based on standardized recording by interviewing
patients’ families, convalescents, members of the mission, and
the Bumba administrative community, with the help of inter-
preters ﬂuent in Lingala and Budza, and by reviewing hospital
records by teams under the direction of Joel Breman of the
CDC. Margarethe Isaacson of the South African Institute of
Medical Research, Pierre Sureau, Peter Piot, J. M. Mbuyi and
V. Kintoki of the DRC, and David Heymann of the CDC also
recorded clinical and epidemiological information that was in-
corporated into the ﬁnal International Commission report and
individual presentations at a conference held in Antwerp in
1978 [1, 9–12]. Control measures, initiated by Commissaire
Ilongo, national authorities, and Jean-François Ruppol in
Bumba Zone, were strengthened by the guidance of the Interna-
tional Commission in Kinshasa and nationally, which had expe-
rience in the eradication of smallpox and surveillance for
monkeypox [13]; in particular, isolation of patients and rapid
burial were accepted by the community. Successful restricting
of movement of Ngaliema Hospital staff in Kinshasa for 3
weeks occurred [14].
Studies were performed in accordance with Zaire clinical
practices, considering the acute nature of the epidemic.
PLASMAPHERESIS AND PLASMA USE
A plasmapheresis program began in early November 1976 by Karl
Johnson, Daniel Courtois and B. Dujeu of the Hospital Laveran
Figure 1. An electron micrograph of Marburg virus, obtained on 13 October 1976 at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
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(Marseille, France), and Margarethe Isaacson, starting with the
ﬁrst 2 convalescent patients brought from Yambuku to Kinsha-
sa. The program was continued until the end of January 1977 in
Yambuku by David Heymann, with convalescent patients iden-
tiﬁed by IFA testing of over 1400 sera by Guido van der Groen
and Karl Johnson in the ﬁeld and by Patricia Webb in Atlanta;
Webb ensured that the ﬁeld had a constant supply of antigen-
coated slides for IFA testing.
A laboratory worker in the MRE contracted Ebola via a needle
stick on 5 November. The infection was caused by an Ebola Zaire
strain from a liver sample injected into a guinea pig. The patient
received a course of puriﬁed human interferon beginning 20
hours after onset of symptoms. Two units of Ebola Zaire conva-
lescent plasma were shipped urgently from DRC and treatment
was begun 47 hours after symptom onset: the patient recovered,
but the role of the plasma is unknown [15]. Another 2 units were
given to a Peace Corps volunteer working with the International
Commission in the ﬁeld and laboratory who developed headache,
fever, myalgia, and a morbilliform eruption and was evacuated to
Johannesburg; he did not have Ebola, nor was another diagnosis
made. The remaining units from the plasma collection program
were divided between laboratories in Kinshasa, Antwerp, Porton
Down, and Atlanta. Plasma was believed to be the only speciﬁc
treatment for laboratory workers or others possibly infected acci-
dentally with Ebola. There was no guarantee of the plasma’s
efﬁcacy or safety at that time.
SEARCH FOR VECTOR
Investigations in Zaire in 1976 included questioning communi-
ty leaders, patients’ families, and convalescents about animal
contact. No animals, including bats, were incriminated; a limit-
ed number of bed bugs, mosquitoes, domestic pigs, rodents,
bats, nonhuman primates, and antelopes were collected by
Max Germain of the Ofﬁce du Rēcherche Scientiﬁque et Tech-
nique d’outre-mer (now referred to as the Institut de Recherche
pour le Développement). Suspensions of insects and organs
from animals were inoculated into Vero cells and none grew
virus [1]. In 1979, a multidisciplinary animal capture study
looking for Ebola virus and human monkeypox (another
emerging infection in the DRC) was undertaken in the general
area of the outbreak. This expedition was led by Joel Breman,
who was then at the Smallpox Eradication Unit, WHO. Over
1600 animals were sampled, including 463 bats and 267 nonhu-
man primates. Culture on Vero cells and IFA testing of serum at
the CDC were all negative for virus and evidence of prior expo-
sure to Ebola Zaire virus [16].
NAMING OF EBOLAVIRUS
The Ebola river is 250 km in length and part of the Congo River
network, about 60 km from Yambuku and not in the area of the
epidemic. During the 1976 ﬁeld investigations, Karl Johnson,
the International Commission scientiﬁc director, suggested
the name “Ebola” virus to ensure that the Yambuku community
was not stigmatized. The name is a distortion of the local
Ngbandi name Legbala, meaning “white water” or “pure
water,” although there is some disagreement [17]. The name
Ebola was accepted by International Commission members in
Kinshasa. At a meeting in London in 1977 to discuss the ﬁrst
2 outbreaks, the name Ebola was accepted after some debate.
RELEVANCE OF THE 1976 OUTBREAK TO THE 2013–
2016 EPIDEMIC
Key to diagnosis in 1976 was the relatively quick recognition of
a severe, possibly new, disease by national authorities. Interna-
tional notiﬁcation and specimen provision occurred within 5
weeks from onset of the ﬁrst cases; this did not occur in the
2013–2016 epidemic, in which the delay was >3 months
(Table 3). In 1976, one laboratory (the CDC) could identify a
new agent using reagents archived from previous Marburg
virus outbreaks. The CDC assessed the presence of viremia in
8 patients and analyzed serial viremia levels in one patient,
using Vero cell culture [1, 4]; all these patients died.
One serologic diagnostic test, the IFA, was used in the ﬁeld in
1976 to identify infected individuals who had recovered. Once
the cell culture ﬁxed slides were available, the turnaround for
IFA testing was generally ≤1 hour; this required separation of
the plasma or serum, incubation of the slide with the serum,
and reading in an immunoﬂuorescence microscope. Results
were available in the ﬁeld promptly because survivors and po-
tential candidates for plasmapheresis needed to be assessed
carefully. The IFA test was later found to lack speciﬁcity as com-
pared to enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay, which has been
used more extensively since the 1990s [18]. In the 2013–2016
epidemic, 44 diagnostic laboratories working in 3 countries
used reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction giving
qualitative results [19].
The serological results in 1976 showed 38 positive individu-
als, several of whom had very few signs and symptoms [1, 9].
This indicated that Ebola may have been present in the area be-
fore the outbreak. Serum specimens with antibodies to Ebola
virus are being reported from West Africa in specimens collect-
ed for Lassa fever and other studies [20, 21]. Nosocomial trans-
mission and susceptibility of healthcare staff have been the
hallmarks of virtually all ﬁlovirus outbreaks, particularly in
the DRC [22]. While injections have not been reported as a
transmission vehicle in the West African outbreak, contaminat-
ed injections, as occurred in 1976, remain a constant danger.
The 21-day maximum incubation period for individuals and
the 42-day period for quarantine of populations exposed to
Ebola, determined in 1976, remain in wide use. Importation
into Kinshasa by plane occurred in 1976, and one secondarily
infected health worker was moving freely in the city for at least
48 hours; yet, no urban transmission occurred as in West Africa
in large numbers. The low overall secondary attack rate in
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families in Yambuku of 5.6% and decreasing transmission rates
by generation of spread indicated the disease had limited trans-
mission potential, except in special circumstances (Table 4).
However, a recent calculation of the person-to-person basic re-
production rate (R0) during the intensifying and dangerous early
course of the 1976 outbreak was 1.34, with a 3% chance that
≥1000 cases could have occurred if control measures were de-
layed [23].Calculations of R0 occurring during the ﬁrst 9 months
in West African outbreaks have ranged from 1.71 for Guinea,
1.83 for Liberia, and 2.02 for Sierra Leone [24].Other calculations
for past outbreaks have been more variable [25].
While the efﬁcacy of immunotherapy (and other treatments)
for Ebola remain unknown, this avenue of research is underway
in West Africa; a trial in Guinea did not ﬁnd improvement with
convalescent plasma [26].
Community involvement was crucial to success for under-
standing and controlling the 1976 outbreak. Factors causing
the more extensive and explosive spread in 2013–2016 need
elaboration. Regrettably, in 2013–2016 many rural and urban
populations were uncooperative with national and international
authorities. Much more medical, sociological, and behavioral
research is needed to understand the recent community con-
straints leading to epidemic prolongation and disruption of
medical and administrative services [27].
To rule out other diseases, suspected febrile Ebola patients in
1976 were treated for malaria, enteric and respiratory disease,
and other conditions by national clinicians. In the recently es-
tablished Ebola treatment units, malaria prophylaxis and treat-
ment were provided; some Ebola treatment units also treated
bacterial infections with antibiotics. As the epidemic pro-
gressed, the national health services were overwhelmed by sus-
pected Ebola patients, and malaria diagnostic assays and
treatments were reduced greatly, resulting in thousands of ex-
cess deaths from malaria [28].
DISCUSSION
In an epidemic situation, research should be well deﬁned and
begin as soon as feasible in accordance with national and insti-
tutional approvals. Patient management can be an area of re-
search requiring standardized protocols and careful record
keeping. During an acute outbreak, patient care and biosafety
have priority. Studies of drugs and vaccines are a particular
challenge in a crisis situation, where there is pressure to use
Table 4. Secondary Attack Rates of Ebola Virus Disease Among Family
Contacts, by Source of Illness, Democratic Republic of Congo, 1976
Generation
Families
Attack
No. Exposures Cases Rate, %
1 (injection) 61 498 38 7.6
2 (person-to-person) 62 459 20 4.4
3 (person-to-person) 18 117 3 2.6
4 (person-to-person) 5 29 1 3.4
Total 146 1103 62 5.6
Delivered fetus or was caregiving
spouse
. . . . . . . . . 27.0
Table 3. Key Points Tying the 1976 Ebola Virus Outbreak to the 2013–2016 Epidemic
Event
1976 Democratic Republic of the Congo (Formerly,
Zaire) 2013–2016 Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia
Deaths/cases, proportion (%) 280/318 (88) 11 310/28 616 (39); as of 31 March 2016
Time first case from onset to
international alert
Approximately 5 wk (26 August–28 September) Guinea, >12 wk (26 December 2013–22 March 2014)
International Commission convened 18 October:
approximately 8 wk
WHO emergency declared 8 August 2014: >32 wk
Local containment Hospital closed 30 September; isolation and rapid
burial
Difficult; some families and communities initially uncooperative;
health services overwhelmed
Quarantine imposed Effective in rural and urban settings Initially ineffective; community mutiny, rural and urban areas
Spread to urban sites Transmission chain to 2 persons in Kinshasa Rapid spread from forest to multiple urban sites; followed transport
routes
International spread None Elsewhere in Africa/Europe/United States
Incubation range; quarantine period 2–21 d; 42-d quarantine 21 d; use as maximum 42-d quarantine
Viral load and presence CPE/qualitative-quantitative (1 laboratory, CDC) RT-PCR, qualitative (44 laboratories in the field)
Serological IFA (rapid diagnosis in field) ELISA (delayed results)
Plasmapheresis collection and effect Started early, uncertain effect No improvement in survival
Treated other diseases services Yes Yes in ETUs: variable, health services overwhelmed
Sequelae Not studied Ophthalmologic, neurological, psychological; semen and eye with
virus; sexual transmission
Research Limited epidemiology, virology, ecology Extensive: immunotherapy, drugs, vaccines, transmission, personal
protection
Abbreviations: CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; CPE, cytopathic effect; ELISA, enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay; ETUs, Ebola treatment units; IFA, immunofluorescence
antibody; RT-PCR, reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction; WHO, World Health Organization.
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all modalities available, proven or not; thus, randomized trials
are particularly difﬁcult to do.
While not proven, it is highly likely that the adult patient with
“epistaxis, dysentery, and fever” was the ﬁrst 1976 Ebola patient.
No other patient with a hemorrhagic syndrome had been ad-
mitted to the YMH in the previous 8 months. Regrettably, no
outpatient records were available despite >1000 visits occurring
monthly. In 1976, there were no reports of bat ingestion, and no
sick animal contact was reported at the interviews and animal
captures in 1976 and 1979. The index case in Guinea in the re-
cent outbreak is alleged by many early media reports to have
been playing under a tree laden with bats, but the connection
between the tree and disease has never been proven.
National health ofﬁcials and resident Belgian and French
physicians were the ﬁrst to see and assess patients in Yambuku.
The Antwerp ITM team was the ﬁrst to receive specimens and
recover what they called a “Marburg-like virus,” as did the MRE.
However, it was the CDC laboratory that identiﬁed and recog-
nized a new hitherto unknown virus that fulﬁlled the criteria for
discovery of a new virus [29]. Because of the lack of information
about the nature and evolution of the disease, the remoteness of
Yambuku (1100 km from Kinshasa), the concern with patients
being treated in Kinshasa, and the lack of early contact tracing,
with rumors of similar disease outbreaks elsewhere in the country,
the distribution curve and course of the outbreak were unclear ini-
tially to the International Commission. In time, the International
Commission found that the outbreak was waning (Figure 2). This
was undoubtedly due to the isolation of the affected Yambuku
community, effective control measures in Bumba Zone and
Kinshasa, and relatively low transmission potential.
Ebola is a contact disease, with blood and other virus-laden
body ﬂuids the source of person-to-person transmission. Hospi-
tal closure, isolation of patients, culturally sensitive rapid burial,
and community cooperation and quarantine were initiated early
in the Yambuku area. These public health measures were not in
implemented initially in West Africa. As the veritable tsunami of
patients overwhelmed the health and administrative systems, the
ﬁrst efforts were understandably to treat the sick—and only later
to focus on public health containment. Many groups have as-
sessed the West Africa outbreak and advised prediction and pre-
vention strategies, rather than only detection and response,
important as both approaches may be [27, 30].
Figure 2. Cases and key events during Ebola hemorrhagic fever outbreak, equatorial region, Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly referred to as Zaire), by time of
onset, 26 August 1976–30 January 1977. Abbreviations: CAR, Central African Republic; CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
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True viral load has almost never been measured serially in
patients in any Ebola outbreak. Viral RNA copies are not infec-
tious: we need data on how long, how much, and where infec-
tious virus is present, with clinical correlations. Ebola RNA
copies in semen and the eye have been found recently, and
the importance of these ﬁndings, particularly in regard to sexual
and prolonged transmission of Ebola, is being deﬁned. Virus in
testes is undoubtedly a major factor in the recent (2016) cluster
of cases occurring in the forest area of Guinea and extending
into Liberia [31].
Notwithstanding the trepidation in dealing with a new path-
ogen of very high virulence causing widespread panic and con-
fusion, there was an exciting sense of discovery and camaraderie
among team members of the 1976 International Commission.
Zaire team members wanted to describe ﬁrst the key clinical
and epidemiological features of the disease and any links to
the Sudan outbreak. Why the 2 events occurred almost simul-
taneously remains an unexplained coincidence.
Fruit bats are now incriminated as probable reservoirs for ﬁlo-
viruses, and Ebola virus genome and antibodies have been found
in bat and rodent species in East and West Africa [32–34].Mar-
burg virus has been isolated from bats in parts of Africa [35–37].
A recent survey of human exposure to animals in the DRC shows
that contact with bats occurs much less often than with rodents,
duikers, and nonhuman primates [38]. There is now some evi-
dence from serologic surveys that African populations are ex-
posed to Ebola virus and Marburg virus during interepidemic
periods [20, 21]. If this ﬁnding is veriﬁed elsewhere, one can con-
clude, as we did in Zaire, that the ﬁloviruses in Africa are enzootic
and epizootic within the so-called ﬁlovirus triangle [39, 40];
more-extensive preparations are needed to detect and manage fu-
ture outbreaks promptly. Severely ill febrile patients, particularly
with hemorrhagic manifestations, should be screened for Ebola
virus and other pathogens; such conditions are often misdiag-
nosed and result in nosocomial ampliﬁcation and community
spread. Primary prevention through strengthened prediction
models, detection, response, control mechanisms, and interna-
tional cooperation and coordination are essential for all countries
in Africa and elsewhere where Ebola virus and new and reemer-
gent pathogens are sure to surface again.
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